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THE EVOLUTION OF ANTIMONOPOLY PROCEEDINGS IN 
JAPAN: OBSERVATIONS OF THIRD PARTY STANDING TO SUE 
IN THE CASE INVOLVING JASRAC 
Yutaka Ishida1 
 Abstract:  Japan’s Antimonopoly Proceeding has repeatedly changed 
throughout the 21st century.  Originally enacted as the Preliminary Review Procedure, 
the administrative process evolved into the Complaint Review Procedure from 2005 to 
2013, before becoming the Direct Appeal to District Court Procedure in effect now.  The 
proceedings allow the Japan Fair Trade Commission ("JFTC") to regulate the market and 
shield it from monopolistic behavior.  The Japanese Society for Rights of Authors, 
Composers, and Publishers ("JASRAC") dominates the music copyright management 
service provider industry in Japan.  The company's fee collection methods led the JFTC 
to issue it a cease and desist order under the Antimonopoly Act.  JASRAC subsequently 
initiated the administrative review process, which was the Complaint Review Procedure 
at the time, and the case was eventually appealed to the Supreme Court of Japan.  During 
the litigation process, e-License, JASRAC's sole competitor, became involved as well, 
raising unique third party standing issues in conjunction with the Antimonopoly Act.  
Accompanied by a partial translation of the Tokyo High Court opinion in the JASRAC 
case, this comment analyzes the Japanese Antimonopoly Act and its administrative 
review process, while focusing on the procedural posture presented.  As the Japanese 
government continues its efforts to halt monopolistic activities and enforce the statute, 
the issue of whether third parties have standing to sue will remain relevant moving 
forward. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Japanese Diet passed the Act on Prohibition of Private 
Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade (the “Antimonopoly Act” or 
“AMA”) in order to “promote fair trade and competition” of the market by 
“prohibiting private monopolization” and “other unjust restrictions on 
business activities.” 2   The AMA establishes the Japan Fair Trade 
Commission (“JFTC”) as the administrative body to regulate the market for 
this purpose.3  One of the tools that the JFTC employs is the issuance of a 
cease and desist order against a private party’s exclusionary act.4  If a party 
disagrees with such an order, the AMA provides an appeals process (the 
“Antimonopoly Proceeding”).  However, the exact structure of the 
Antimonopoly Proceeding has not been uniform in Japan during the 21st 
Century.  Major amendments to the AMA have significantly transformed it, 
																																								 																				
1  Yutaka Ishida, J.D. 2017, University of Washington School of Law. He would like to thank 
Professor Jody Chafee for his generous support in reviewing both translation and comment pieces.   
2  Shiteki-dokusen no kinshi oyobi kōseitorihiki no kakuho ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Prohibition of 
Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade], Law No. 54 of 1949, art. 1. 
http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/legislation_gls/amended_ama09/index.files/The_Antimonopoly_Act.pdf (Japan). 
3  Id. at art. 27.  
4  Id. at art. 7.  
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with each iteration bearing a new name: from the Preliminary Review 
Procedure, to the Complaint Review Procedure from 2005 to 2013, and to 
the Direct Appeal to the District Court Procedure from 2013 onward.5 
The transition between each amendment produced some uncertainties 
in the specific application of the Antimonopoly Proceeding.  One of the 
issues that arose during the era of the Complaint Review Procedure—and is 
still unclear under the current Direct Appeal to the District Court 
Procedure—is a third party’s standing to sue.6  The issue arose in 2009 
during a case involving the Japanese Society for Rights of Authors, 
Composers, and Publishers (“JASRAC”), the dominant music copyright 
management service provider in the market.7  The JFTC originally issued a 
cease and desist order against JASRAC, alleging monopolistic activity in the 
music copyright industry.  The JFTC conducted administrative hearings, and 
ultimately decided to withdraw the order.  e-License, JASRAC’s sole 
competitor, appealed the JFTC’s decision and requested that the 
organization reinstate the order, despite being a mere third party to the 
proceeding.8  Because of this third-party involvement, the Tokyo High Court 
extensively discussed e-License’s standing to sue in its opinion, particularly 
because the company was a competitor who neither received the cease and 
desist order nor participated in the JFTC’s hearings.9  The Tokyo High Court 
acknowledged e-License’s claim to be a proper plaintiff, and e-License 
consequently won the case at the Tokyo High Court and at the Supreme 
Court on the ground that JASRAC’s fee collection method violated the 
AMA.  This case marked the first instance, under the AMA in Japan, where 
a third party brought a case to an appellate court as a proper plaintiff to 
continue a legal proceeding initiated at the administrative level.10  
																																								 																				
5  Hirozumi Uchida and Kaori Sasai, Koseitorihiki Iinkai Ni Okeru Shinpanseido No Haishi 
[Abolishment of the Hearing Process], Keizai Sangyo Iinkai 44, 46 (2010). 
6  Nobuo Shimazaki, Daisanshani Yoru Hatarakikake Heno Taiou [Response to Actions Called by 
Third Parties], 1467 JURIST 32, 35 (2014). 
7  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 28, 2015, Hei 27 (gyō-hi) no. 75, 69 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 2(1) (Japan). 
8  Id. 
9  Hidekatsu Hirabayashi, Shiteki Dokusen No Hajijo No Kouka Ga Arutoshi, Haijosochi Meirei Wo 
Torikesu Shinketsu Wo Torikeshita Hanketsu: JASRAC Case [Judgment to Revoke the Withdrawal of the 
Order Based on the Finding that There was an Effect of Private Monopoly], 1466 JURIST 252, 252 (2014). 
10  Minoru Fujita. Nihon Ongaku Chosaku Kyoukai (JASRAC) Jiken Shinketsu Torikeshi Shōso Tokyo 
Kousai Hanketsu: Genkoku Tekikaku To Jisshitsu Shouko Housoku [Tokyo High Court’s Judgment of the 
Revocation of the Order on JASRAC Incident], 45 BULL. OF YAMAGATA U. 128, 134 (2014), 
http://www2.lib.yamagata-u.ac.jp/kiyou/kiyous/kiyous-45-1/image/kiyous-45-1-129to151.pdf. 
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As a result of this dispute, many scholars have published articles 
interpreting the Tokyo High Court’s opinion and discussing whether the 
third party standing to sue should have been recognized under the AMA in 
Japan.  Although the structure of the Antimonopoly Proceeding was 
amended in 2013, the new AMA does not answer the third party standing to 
sue question explicitly, nor has the Japanese judiciary addressed it.11  Thus, 
this comment will review and analyze the Tokyo High Court’s opinion about 
a third party’s standing to sue in an effort to understand the reasoning behind 
the court’s decision. This comment is also supplemented by a segment of the 
Tokyo High Court’s opinion, which was originally issued only in Japanese, 
translated by the Washington International Law Journal.12 
This comment will proceed by introducing the evolution of the 
Antimonopoly Proceeding in Japan as a result of two major reforms to the 
AMA.  Then, Part III examines the Antimonopoly Proceeding that JASRAC 
completed under the Complaint Review Procedure, followed by a discussion 
of the third party’s standing to sue issue at Tokyo High Court. Part IV 
reviews scholars’ analysis on the standing to sue issue and potential 
influence to the Direct Appeal to the District Court Procedure.  Finally, Part 
V concludes by analyzing the effect of the abolishment of the JFTC hearing 
and judgment process under the Antimonopoly Act and the potential policy 
ramifications moving forward. 
II. REFORMS OF THE ANTIMONOPOLY PROCEEDING  
There have been two rounds of significant reforms to the 
Antimonopoly Proceeding in Japan during the 21st Century as a result of 
major amendments to the AMA in 2005 and 2013.13  In this section, key 
features of each procedure will be introduced.  
A. Pre-2005 Antimonopoly Proceeding: Preliminary Review 
Procedure  
Under the Preliminary Review Procedure, the JFTC’s Antimonopoly 
Proceeding started with an adversarial hearing hosted by the JFTC’s 
administrative committee as the court of first instance. 14   If the JFTC 
																																								 																				
11  See Nobuo Shimazaki, supra note 6.  
12  Chengyu Shi, Tokyo High Court, Judgment for JASRAC Case (2013) (Japan), 26 WASH. INT'L J. 
573 (June 2017).  
13  See supra note 5.  
14  Sadaaki Suwazono, Kaiseidokusenkinshihou No Gaiyou [Summary of the Amendment of the 
Antimonopoly Act] 1294 JURIST 2, 6 (2005). 
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committee found that it is valid to impose a cease and desist order, the JFTC 
issued the order against addressee; this administrative judgment of the JFTC 
was recognized as a semi-legal function to review the legitimacy of the 
order.15  If an addressee objected the cease and desist order, it had an option 
to bring an appeal to the Tokyo High Court and, subsequently, to the 
Supreme Court.  
On the one hand, this procedure provided a certain level of fairness of 
the judgment against the addressee because before the imposition of the 
cease and desist order, the addressee had an opportunity to communicate 
with the JFTC committee.  On the other hand, by requiring the hearing 
process before imposing the cease and desist order, there were concerns that 
it could delay the resolution of the market distraction.16  
B. 2005–2013 Antimonopoly Proceeding: Complaint Review 
Procedure  
As a result, in April 2005, the AMA was amended (the “2005 
Amendment”) and was put into force on January 4, 2006.17  Along with the 
Amendment, the JFTC published the Rules on Administrative Investigations 
by the Fair Trade Commission (the “2005 Investigation Rules”) and the 
Rules on Hearing by Fair Trade Commission (the “2005 Hearing Rules”) to 
illustrate the exact application of the process.18  A major change brought by 
this amendment was that the JFTC gained the capacity to issue a cease and 
desist order after conducting a summary investigation but before full 
hearings.19  If the addressee was unsatisfied with the order, it was able to 
bring an appeal to the JFTC committee for hearings, which acted as a semi-
legal measure.20  If a party was still dissatisfied with the judgment after the 
hearings, the case could be brought to Tokyo High Court as a further appeal 
																																								 																				
15  Id.  
16  See supra note 5.  
17  Kimitoshi Yabuki, Dokusenhou No Kaisei To Shinpan Seido [Reform of the Antimonopoly Act and 
Shinpan Seido], TOKYO U. L. REV. 267, 267 (2008), http://www.sllr.j.u-
tokyo.ac.jp/03/papers/v03part18.pdf. 
18  Publication of the Cabinet Ordinances and the Fair Trade Commission Rules Related to the 
Implementation of the Amended Antimonopoly Act, JFTC (Oct. 6, 2005) 
http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly_2005/oct/individual_000235.html. 
19  Jouji Atsuya, Dokusenkinshihou No Henyou [Change in the Antimonopoly Act], 1382 JURIST 115, 
116 (2009). 
20  See supra note 5, at 44.  
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and subsequently brought before the Supreme Court.21  Upon these appellate 
reviews, the evidence gathered during the hearings were used.22  
This process was aimed to eliminate monopolistic behavior in a timely 
manner in order to maintain healthy competition in the market.23  However, 
at the same time, there were some concerns about the misjudgment and 
overexpansion of the JFTC’s sovereignty.  Furthermore, there appeared to be 
a conflict of the JFTC’s committee to overturn the cease and desist order 
made by JFTC officers.  Indeed, the JASRAC case, which will be covered 
below, was the only case where the JFTC withdrew the order during this 
scheme.24  
C. Post-2013 (Current) Antimonopoly Proceeding—Direct Appeal 
to District Court Procedure 
Another bill to amend the Antimonopoly Act was submitted to the 
National Diet on May 24th, 2013, and was approved and enacted by both 
houses during the 185th Diet Session on December 7th, 2013.25  After the 
advisory panel sought the exact application of the new Antimonopoly 
Proceedings, the JFTC subsequently published the Guidelines on 
Administrative Investigation Procedure under the Antimonopoly Act (the 
“2013 Investigation Rules”) on December 25, 2015.26   
Unlike the Complaint Review Procedure, when an addressee receives 
a cease and desist order under the 2013 Investigation Rules, a party 
demanding to revoke a cease and desist order made by the JFTC will bring 
the claim against the JFTC directly to the Tokyo District Court Civil 
Department No. 8. 27   Also, because it abolished the hearing process, 
evidentiary findings will be conducted at the District Court, as opposed to 
																																								 																				
21  Id. 
22  Id.  
23  See supra note 5. 
24  Between 2008 to 2016, there were 56 incidents the JFTC committee heard to determine the 
validity of the cease and desist order under the Complaint Review Procedure: 3 in 2008, 11 in 2009, 3 in 
2010, 4 in 2011, 4 in 2012, 3 in 2013, 15 in 2014, 7 in 2015, and 6 in 2016. See List of Judgments, JFTC, 
http://www.jftc.go.jp/shinketsu/itiran/index.html (last visited May 13, 2017). 
25  Enactment of the Bill to Amend the Antimonopoly Act, Japan Fair Trade Commission, (Dec. 9, 
2013), http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2013/Dec/individual131209.files/131209FT.pdf. 
26  Guidelines on Administrative Investigation Procedures under the Antimonopoly Act (Tentative 
Translation), Japan Fair Trade Commission, (Dec. 25, 2015), http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-
2015/December/151225.files/151225_3.pdf. 
27  Nobuo Shimazaki, Shinpan Seido Haishigo No Dokusenkinshihō Koukoku Soshouni Kansuru 
Kousatsu [Analysis on the Revocation Lawsuit After the Abandonment of the Judgment Procedure], 1085 
NBL 23, 23 (2016). 
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the previous structure of using the evidence found through the JFTC 
hearing.28  
III. ANTIMONOPOLY LEGAL PROCEEDING AGAINST JASRAC AND STANDING 
TO SUE ISSUE 
Provided that such an evolution of the Antimonopoly Proceeding 
existed in Japan, we will now look at a landmark case that illustrated a 
potential issue of the Antimonopoly Proceeding in Japan– a case involving 
JASRAC.  JASRAC is in the business of music copyright management 
service providers and copyright societies, which collect copyrights from 
music labels or directly from artists and songwriters, and provides an 
entrusted license to interested parties (“licensees”).  Once licensees use the 
copyrights, music copyright management service companies collect the fees 
from the licensees and distribute the royalties back to the labeling companies 
and artists after deducting management fees for their services.29  In Japan, 
JASRAC has dominated the music copyright management service industry, 
and as of 2015 it was entrusted with approximately 98% of the music rights 
in Japan.30   
Finding that JASRAC appeared to be violating the AMA, the JFTC 
imposed a cease and desist order in 2009.31  From the placement of the cease 
and desist order to the Supreme Court decision finding that JASRAC’s 
blanket fee license method indeed violated the AMA, there was a unique 
twist in the legal proceeding: the third party standing to sue.  In order to fully 
explain the context behind how the issue arose, this section reviews the entire 
legal proceeding that JASRAC took at each stage of judiciary.  Once the 
Antimonopoly Proceeding is laid out, we will further cover the third party’s 
right to standing to sue, which was extensively discussed at the Tokyo High 




28  Id. at 28. 
29  The fee deducted between collection and distribution was 0.07% in 2015. [¥111,670,041,471 (total 
collected)- ¥111,591,389,624 (total distributed)] / ¥111,670,041,471(total collected) = 0.07%. JASRAC 
Statistics, (May 13, 2017), http://www.jasrac.or.jp/ejhp/about/statistics.html. 
30  AVEX GROUP HOLDINGS INC., ANNOUNCEMENT REGARDING MERGER OF EQUITY METHOD 
AFFILIATES AND NAME CHANGE OF SURVIVING COMPANY (2015) [hereinafter AVEX ANNOUNCEMENT]. 
31  Cease and Desist Order against Japanese Society for Rights of Authors, Composers and 
Publishers. JFTC. (Feb. 27, 2009), http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2009/feb/individual-
000063.html. 
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A. JASRAC Legal Proceeding  
Under the Complaint Review Procedure, there are potentially four 
layers of legal proceedings of the Antimonopoly Proceeding: (a) issuance of 
the cease and desist order by the JFTC, (b) the JFTC’s administrative 
hearings followed by a judgment, (c) appellate review by the Tokyo High 
Court, and (d) appellate review by the Supreme Court of Japan.32  This 
subsection reviews the entire legal proceeding that JASRAC took at each 
stage.   
1. Cease and Desist Order  
In 2009, the JFTC issued a cease and desist order against JASRAC 
under the AMA on the ground that its fee method prevented other 
organizations from entering the music copyright management service 
business and expanding business operations in Japan.33   
Established under the Act of Brokerage Services for Copyrights in 
1939, 34 JASRAC was originally the sole organization administration body to 
control music copyright in Japan.35  This dynamic changed in 2001 when the 
Japanese Diet replaced the Act of Brokerage Services for Copyrights with 
the Act on Copyright, etc. Management Service in October 2001. 36  
According to the Agency for Cultural Affairs of Japan, this reform was 
partially intended for new entrants in the music copyright management 
service industry to come in with a simple registration process, as opposed to 
																																								 																				
32  Timeline of the entire legal proceeding is summarized by JASRAC. JASRAC, Chronology of the 
Case, http://www.jasrac.or.jp/ejhp/release/2015/pdf/release_150428.pdf. 
33  Cease and Desist Order against Japanese Society for Rights of Authors, Composers and 
Publishers, JFTC (Feb. 27, 2009), http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2009/feb/individual-
000063.html. After the Amendment to the AMA in 2009, the exclusionary monopolization requires fine 
under article 7, section 2, para. 4 of the AMA, but the cease and desist order was issued before the exercise 
date of the amendment, Jan. 1, 2010. Tadashi Shiraishi, JASRAC Shinketsu Torikeshi Soshou: Toukyou 
Kousai Hanketsu No Kentou [JASRAC Lawsuit Regarding Revocation of Judgement: Analysis of Tokyo 
High Court’s Ruling], 1015 NBL 15, 16 (2013). 
34  Chūkai Gyōmuhō [Act of Brokerage Services for Copyright], Law No. 67 of 1939 (Japan).  
35  Chosakukentou Kanrijigyou No Genjouni Tsuite [The Current Status of the Act on Copyright, etc. 
Management Service] MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE, SPORTS, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY – JAPAN. 
http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/bunka/toushin/05090803/002.htm. 
36  Chosakuken kanri jigyōhō [Act on Copyright, etc. Management Service], Law No. 131 of 2000, 
(Japan). The official government translation of the law is the Act on Copyright, etc. Management Service. 
However, the government website translates only the title: 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=1467&vm=&re=02. The World Intellectual 
Property Organization translates the entire act into English and titles it as Law on Management Business of 
Copyright and Neighboring Rights: http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=228673. JASRAC also 
uses the term Law on Management Business of Copyright and Neighboring Rights. 
http://www.jasrac.or.jp/ejhp/about/admini_env.html. 
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an approval requirement of the former system. 37   As a result of the 
enactment of the new law, e-License entered the music copyright 
management service industry.  However, e-License was unable to expand 
and gain substantial market share to compete with JASRAC due to 
JASRAC’s dominance in the market.   
Specifically, the JFTC reasoned that JASRAC’s most used fee 
collection method, the blanket fee collection method, induced this result.38  
JASRAC’s blanket fee collection method charged licensees a predetermined 
percentage (such as 1.5%) of the licensees’ revenue derived from using 
copyrighted music.39  By paying this fee, licensees had the right to play any 
and all of the compositions owned by the members of JASRAC’s affiliates 
as often as the licensees desire for a stated term. 40   Since JASRAC 
historically possessed most of the music copyrights that existed in Japan, 
this fee method allowed licensees to use virtually all songs in Japan if they 
entered into the blanket licensing agreement with JASRAC.  As an 
alternative fee-collecting mechanism, JASRAC also offered companies to 
enter the song-by-song licensing agreement, but this was rarely used by 
licensees due to the high pricing of using each song.41  Since JASRAC 
owned virtually all music copyrights in Japan, licensees had no incentive to 
contract with other music copyright management service companies as long 
as they bound the blanket license agreement with JASRAC.  The JFTC 
indicated that management business operators other than JASRAC face 
difficulties in the market because their managed music works “are hardly 
used in the broadcast programs, and also because they can hardly secure the 
musical works expected to be used for broadcasting.”42 
With this reasoning, the JFTC issued a cease and desist order against 




37  Kanrijigyouhō to chūkaigyoumuhū no hikaku [Comparison of Copyright Agency Business Law 
and Copyright Management Business Law], AGENCY FOR CENTRAL AFFAIRS, 
http://www.bunka.go.jp/seisaku/chosakuken/seidokaisetsu/kanrijigyoho/seitei/hikaku.html. 
38  Cease and Desist Order against Japanese Society for Rights of Authors, Composers and 
Publishers, JFTC, (Feb. 27, 2009), 2(1). http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2009/feb/individual-
000063.html. 
39  Id.  
40  Id. 
41  Id. 
42  Id. at 2(2).  
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2. JFTC Hearings and Judgment  
Following the 2005 Hearing Rules, JASRAC filed a request for 
hearings by the JFTC’s special committee after receiving the cease and 
desist order.43  The JFTC accepted this request and held thirteen hearings 
with JASRAC to determine whether JASRAC’s blanket fee collection 
method violated the AMA.44   
Although the JFTC committee recognized that other business 
operators, including e-License, might have suffered from the blanket fee 
licensing JASRAC was employing, the committee also found that the lack of 
success by e-License partially stemmed from its own operation.45  After the 
special committee completed all hearings, it found in favor of JASRAC and 
decided to withdraw the cease and desist order under Article 66, paragraph 3 
of the former AMA in June 2012.46  As previously mentioned, this was the 
first time that the JFTC withdrew its order after holding hearings under the 
Complaint Review Procedure.  
3. Tokyo High Court Ruling 
Unsatisfied with the JFTC’s judgment to withdraw the cease and 
desist order against JASRAC, e-License, a sole competitor of JASRAC, filed 
an appeal to the Third Special Unit of Tokyo High Court against the JFTC 
on November 1, 2013.47  As a competitor, e-License demanded protection 
under the AMA and attempted to reverse the ruling.48  Once the Tokyo High 
Court decided to hear the case, JASRAC intervened in the lawsuit on behalf 
																																								 																				
43  Kōsei Torihiki Iinakai [Decision of Fair Trade Commission] Jun. 24, 2012, Hei 21 (han) no. 17, 
KŌSEI TORIHIKI IINKAI SHIKETSU TO DETABESU SHISUTEMU [KOTORII DS], 1, 3 
http://www.jftc.go.jp/houdou/pressrelease/h24/jun/120614.files/12061401shinketsu.pdf (Japan).  
44  (Heisei 24 nen 6 gatsu 14 ka) Ippan shadan houjin nihon ongaku chosakuken kyoukai ni taisuru 
shinketsu ni tsuite (ongaku chosakubutsu no chosakuken ni kakawaru chosakukentou kanri jigyousha ni 
yoru shiteki dokusen) [(June 14, 2012) Regarding the JASRAC Judgment (private monopoly by a music 
copyright management service provider 
concerning copyrights of music works)] Jun. 14, 
2012, http://www.jftc.go.jp/houdou/pressrelease/h24/jun/120614.html. 
45  Kōsei Torihiki Iinakai [Decision of Fair Trade Commission] Jun. 24, 2012, Hei 21 (han) no. 17, 
KŌSEI TORIHIKI IINKAI SHIKETSU TO DETABESU SHISUTEMU [KOTORII DS], 1, 79 
http://www.jftc.go.jp/houdou/pressrelease/h24/jun/120614.files/12061401shinketsu.pdf (Japan).  
46  Id. at 81.  
47  Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tōkyō High. Ct.] Nov. 01. 2013, Hei 25 (ke) no. 8, Kōtō saibansho 
hanreishū [Saibansho web] 1, 3 (Japan). 
48  Id.  
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of the JFTC under Article 22, Section 1 of the Administrative Case 
Litigation Act.49  
This case represented the first instance where a third party who was 
not a respondent or addressee of the JFTC’s judgment continued a legal 
proceeding to the appellate level.50  The AMA specified the JFTC be the 
defendant of the appellate court, but it did not state explicitly whether a third 
party had the right to bring a case to the Tokyo High Court in continuation 
of the JFTC hearings.51  Thus, the first issue discussed at the Tokyo High 
Court was whether a third party had standing to sue, which is the focus of 
this comment as well as the translation piece.52   
After determining three other issues to determine whether JASRAC’s 
conduct constituted exclusionary private monopolization under Article 2, 
Section 5 of the AMA, the Tokyo High Court ruled in favor of e-License and 
decided to overturn the JFTC’s judgment.53 
4. Supreme Court Ruling 
The Supreme Court essentially concurred with the Tokyo High 
Court’s opinion and ruled in favor of e-License on April 28th, 2015. 54  
Despite the fact that the petition for appeal filed by the JFTC contested the 
issue of standing, the Supreme Court rejected this claim and did not touch on 
it in the published opinion. 55   Instead, the Supreme Court found that 
JASRAC caused “a substantial restraint of competition in any particular 
field of trade.”56  After this ruling, the JFTC revoked the withdrawal of the 
cease and desist order, issued, and requested JASRAC to hold further 
hearings. 
																																								 																				
49  Id.; Gyōsei jiken soshou hō [Administrative Case Litigation Act], Law No. 139 of 1962, art. 22 
sec. 1 (Japan).  
50  See Fujita, supra note 10.  
51  Shunji Annen. Koutorii, Hanketsu Torikeshi Soshou No Genkoku Tekikakuni Tsuite [Regarding 
the Standing to Sue in the JFTC’s Revocation of the Order Lawsuit]. 10 CHUŌ L.J. 33, 34. (2013).  
52  Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tōkyō High. Ct.] Nov. 01. 2013, Hei 25 (ke) no. 8, Kōtō saibansho 
hanreishū [Saibansho web] 1, 3 (Japan). 
53  Three other issues are the following: Errors in Findings, Errors in the Judgment that falls under the 
Exclusionary Private Monopolization, and Defect in Proceeding; Tōkyo Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High 
Court], Nov. 1, 2013, Hei 25 (gyō-ke) no.8, 1(4) (Japan). 
54  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 28, 2015, Hei 27 (gyō-hi) no. 75, 69 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 4 (Japan). 
55  Saikō Saibansho saibanshū minji [Saishū minji] [The Japanese Supreme Court Civil Law Report]. 
No. 249 of 2015, 518, 531 (Japan). 
56  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 28, 2015, Hei 27 (gyō-hi) no. 75, 69 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 4 (Japan). 
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B. Standing to Sue Issue of the Third Party Competitor	
As mentioned, one of the critical issues discussed at the Tokyo High 
Court was whether e-License, JASRAC’s only competitor, had standing to 
sue at the appellate court under the AMA, despite the fact that it was a third 
party to JASRAC’s original proceeding with the JFTC.57  Interestingly, this 
issue was never questioned because out of 56 cases heard by the JFTC’s 
committee under the Complaint Review Procedure, there was only one case 
where the JFTC committee ruled to withdraw the original cease and desist 
order—this JASRAC case. 58   Since the Supreme Court excluded the 
standing to sue issue from its consideration, the only judicial opinion 
available to us is the Tokyo High Court’s opinion.59  The structure of the 
Tokyo High Court’s opinion tracks the claims asserted by each party—e-
License, JFTC, and JASRA. Ultimately, the Tokyo High Court found e-
License’s argument to be more persuasive.60  
1. Claim made by e-License  
e-License first laid the ground by stating that “[f]ollowing the 
interpretation of the [Antimonopoly Act], the right for fair competition is 
understood as a legal right that is directly protected.” 61   The company 
claimed that the right for fair competition is a legal right, and being the sole 
competitor in the industry, the exclusionary conduct of JASRAC materially 
infringes e-License’s ability to operate properly in the market, taking out a 
right that e-License possesses.  It also claimed that the Act on Copyright etc. 
Management Service similarly advocates for the public interest in the fair 
market.  e-License argued that because it was a sole competitor, it owns the 
“legal interest” to bring a case to the Tokyo High Court to “realize the 




57  Chengyu Shi, supra note 12. 
58  Between 2008 and 2016, there were 56 incidents where the JFTC committee held hearings to 
determine the validity of the cease and desist order under the Appeal Examination Judgment Method. (3 in 
2008, 11 in 2009, 3 in 2010, 4 in 2011, 4 in 2012, 3 in 2013, 15 in 2014, 7 in 2015, and 6 in 2016). See 
http://www.jftc.go.jp/shinketsu/itiran/index.html. 
59  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 28, 2015, Hei 27 (gyō-hi) no. 75, 69 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 2(1) (Japan). 
60  Chengyu Shi, supra note 12. 
61  Id. at V(1) Plaintiff’s Claims, A. 
62  Id. at V(1) Plaintiff’s Claims, C. 
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2. Claim made by the JFTC  
The JFTC provided a counterargument to this claim based on an 
interpretation of the definition of “a person with legal interest” under Article 
9, Section 1 of the Administrative Case Litigation Act.63  To determine the 
application of this term, the JFTC suggested the court look at the content and 
the context of the interests under the intent and purpose of the law. 64  It 
claims that per prior precedents, standing to sue would be limited in an 
unlawful administration judgment to a specific group of parties whose safety 
is threatened, or whose health or living environment is degraded by 
appropriately interpreting the intent and goals of the law that is referenced.65  
The interests that e-License attempts to regain is in the category of economic 
welfare, which does not meet the threshold of the level of interest protected 
by the Administrative Case Litigation Act.66  Because JASRAC was the 
addressee of the order, as well as the respondent in the case, JASRAC was 
the sole party with the “legal interest” to bring the case to the Tokyo High 
Court under the 2005 Hearing Rules.67  
3. Claim made by JASRAC 
JASRAC, as the intervenor, also supported the JFTC’s position by 
stating that the Antimonopoly Act does not protect private interests, only 
public interests.  The direct purpose of the Antimonopoly Act is to promote 
fair and free competition for “the public interest.”68  To achieve this goal, the 
appeals process is reserved in such a way as to rectify infractions of the 
market, not to provide private protection for general consumers or 
competitors.  Within the facts of the case, e-License lied outside of such a 
specific group.  
4. Tokyo High Court’s Opinion  
After hearing claims made by each party, the Tokyo High Court 
concluded that e-License, JASRAC’s sole competitor in the industry, had 
standing to sue because it was not able to perform its operative activities 
within a fair market.  The court ruled that a party who is not a direct 
addressee still has standing to sue if there is likely and unavoidably a direct 
																																								 																				
63  Id. at V(1) Objections from the defendant, A.  
64  Id. at V(1) Objections from the defendant, B. 
65  Id.  
66  Id.  
67  Id. at V(1) Objections from the defendant, D. 
68  Id. at V(1) Intervener’s objections, C. 
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and substantial damage due to the infringement of fair and free competition 
in the market.69  The court emphasized that the damage must be “direct” and 
“substantial.” 70   After the revision of the Act on the Copyright etc. 
Management Services, e-License was “the only competitor in the market of 
the management of copyrights for musical works.”71 Thus, the court found 
that the damage sustained by e-License due to the exclusionary conduct of 
JASRAC was likely and unavoidably “direct” and “substantial.”72  Therefore, 
under the Articles 7, 49, and 66 of the Antimonopoly Act, the Tokyo High 
Court decided to grant standing to sue for e-License, a third party and the 
sole competitor of JASRAC.73   
IV. SCHOLARLY ANALYSIS ON THE STANDING TO SUE ISSUE AND 
APPLICATION TO THE DIRECT APPEAL TO THE DISTRICT COURT 
PROCEDURE 
Many scholars in Japan have analyzed the Tokyo High Court’s 
opinion regarding third-party rights of standing to sue under the AMA to 
assess the validity of the court’s decision.  In general, their opinions can be 
characterized as (1) statutory interpretation of the AMA and the overarching 
Administrative Case Litigation Act and (2) comparisons to precedents that 
touch on thirty party standing to sue.  This section lays out arguments both 
for and against the Tokyo High Court’s ruling regarding the issue of third 
party standing in these regards.  After reviewing arguments from both sides, 
this comment will consider how the ruling could affect the current the Direct 
Appeal to the District Court Procedure. 
A. Reasons to Oppose the Tokyo High Court’s Ruling on a Third 
Party’s Right of Standing to Sue 
Several scholars have questioned or opposed the Tokyo High Court’s 
reasoning and logic to allow a third party to enter an Antimonopoly 
Proceeding from the appellate court level.  As noted, their opinion can be 
categorized into the claims related to statutory interpretation and claims 
based on precedent.  
																																								 																				
69  Id. at Judgment of the Court 1.C.  
70  Kazuhiro Tsuchida, Shinketsu Torikeshi Soshou No Genkoku Tekikaku To Jisshitsuteki Shouko 
Housouku [Standing to Sue of a Lawsuit to Revoke Judgment and the Substantial Evidence Law], 1470 
JURIST 79, 81 (2014). 
71  Chengyu Shi, supra note 12 at 1. D.  
72  Id. at 1.C.  
73  Id. at 1. D. 
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1. Statutory Interpretation  
First of all, some scholars argue that the structure of the Complaint 
Review Procedure, specifically the relationship between administrative 
hearings held by the JFTC’s committee and the revocation suit at the Tokyo 
High Court, would not allow a third party to continue the Antimonopoly 
Proceeding as a sole plaintiff.74  The AMA explicitly states that the Tokyo 
High Court, an appellate court, is the venue in which to bring a request to 
revoke an administrative judgment made by the JFTC committee.75  This 
provision stems from the conceptual idea that the JFTC committee hearings 
act as a semi-legal organization of the judiciary system, which is implicitly 
permitted under Article 76, Section 2 of the Japanese Constitution.76  This 
logic also aligns with other provisions of the AMA.  For example, at the 
Tokyo High Court and with any legal disputes that follow, the parties may 
use only evidence gathered during the JFTC hearings.77  Also, if it requires 
new evidentiary findings, the case is brought back to the JFTC committee 
for further review.78  Recognizing this relationship—that the Tokyo High 
Court’s proceeding as a semi-legal proceeding directly follows the JFTC 
committee’s hearing—these scholars claim that only the addressee of the 
order and the respondent of the JFTC’s judgment, which are both JASRAC, 
should have standing to sue at the Tokyo High Court.79   
Second, the AMA provides the JFTC with discretion to invite a third 
party to join the evidentiary findings during the hearing process.80  e-License, 
however, was not invited to join the hearing process in this JASRAC case.81  
If e-License intervened in the JFTC’s hearing process, there might have been 
a possibility of continuing the proceeding.  However, without it, these 
scholars believe that e-License did not have standing to sue in this case.   
																																								 																				
74  Akimori Uesugi, JASRAC Jiken Shinketsu Torikeshi Soshou [JASRAC Case Regarding the 
Revocation of the Judgment], 1017 NBL 36, 38-39 (2014).  
75  Shiteki-dokusen no kinshi oyobi kōseitorihiki no kakuho ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on Prohibition of 
Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade], Law No. 54 of 1949, art. 87, as amended on April 
27, 2005 (Japan). 
76  NIHONKOKU  KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 76, para. 2 (Japan). 
77  See Shiteki-dokusen no kinshi oyobi kōseitorihiki no kakuho ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on 
Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade], Law No. 54 of 1949, art. 68, as 
amended on April 27, 2005. 
78  See Akimori Uesugi, supra note 74 at 40.  
79  Id. at 39.  
80  See Shiteki-dokusen no kinshi oyobi kōseitorihiki no kakuho ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on 
Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade], Law No. 54 of 1949, art. 70, para. 
3, as amended on April 27, 2005. 
81  Chengyu Shi, supra note 12. 
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Furthermore, Article 709 of Civil Act provides an opportunity for e-
License to directly bring a claim against the injuring party (JASRAC) if the 
injured party (e-License) has sufficient evidence to prove the JASRAC’s 
violation of the AMA.82   
With these arguments, some scholars argue that the Antimonopoly 
Proceeding should be reserved for the discussion between the JFTC and 
JASRAC, the addressee of the cease and desist order.   
2. Comparison with Precedents 
Another approach to questioning the Tokyo High Court’s decision to 
permit e-License to enter the Antimonopoly Proceeding is based on the view 
that courts have been historically and consistently hesitant to provide a mere 
third party standing to sue in administrative cases.  In Shufuren Juice 
Lawsuit, the Supreme Court of Japan did not permit the third party 
comprising consumers to be a plaintiff under the Act Against Unjustifiable 
Premiums and Misleading Representations,83 a forerunner of the AMA.84  
The court found that the interests that regular consumers have are “arbitral, 
average, and common,” and do not meet the degree of the “private and 
special interest” protected by the Act Against Unjustifiable Premiums and 
Misleading Representations.85  Similarly, in the Ebisu Syokuhin Lawsuit, the 
Supreme Court rejected a claim made by a competitor requesting the JFTC 
to further investigate on Ebisu Syokuhin.86  However, the court rejected the 
competitor’s claim by stating that the JFTC’s hearing process is reserved to 
be a venue to protect public, not private interest. 87  Furthermore, when 
archaeologists tried to protect Ibai Remains in Shizuoka prefecture, the 
Supreme Court rejected their standing to sue reasoning that “legal right” 
does not include “cultural right.”88  It is apparent from these cases that 
historically, the AMA aims to protect the public interest, but not the private 
interest of a third party.  
																																								 																				
82  See Akimori Uesugi, supra note 74 at 37.  
83  Keihin Hyouji Hou [Act Against Unjustifiable Premiums and Misleading Representations].  
84  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (Shufuren Juice Lawsuit) Mar. 14, 1974, Shō 49 (tsu) no. 99, 32 Saikō 
Saibansho minji hanreishū [Minshū] 2, 211 (Japan). 
85  Id. 
86  Makoto Kojou, JASRAC Haijo Gata Shiteki Dokusen Jiken: Dai 1 Shin Hanketsu [JASRAC 
Exclusionary Private Monopolization Case] 9 RONKYU JURIST 88, 91 (2014).  
87  Id.; Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 16, 1972, Shō 45 (wo) no. 1055, 16 Saikō Saibansho minji 
hanreishū [Minshū] 9, 1573 (Japan). 
88  Makoto Kojou, JASRAC Haijo Gata Shiteki Dokusen Jiken: Dai 1 Shin Hanketsu [JASRAC 
Exclusionary Private Monopolization Case] 9 RONKYU JURIST 88, 91 (2014); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] 
Jun. 20, 1989, Shō 58 (tsu) no. 98, 59 Saikō Saibansho minji hanreishū [Minshū] 157, 163 (Japan). 
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These scholars further noted that there are cases in which courts 
recognized the third party standing to sue in administrative cases, but in all 
of these cases, third parties joined the case on behalf of the addressees, not 
against these addresses.  e-License was expressly permitted to sue the JFTC 
intervened by the addressee, JASRAC.   
Comparing the JASRAC fact pattern with these lawsuits, scholars 
found that the JASRAC case stands as an anomaly.  
B. Reasoning to Support the Tokyo High Court’s Ruling on the 
Standing to Sue Issue 
In contrast, other scholars concur with the Tokyo High Court in its 
ruling regarding a third party’s standing to sue.  One of the main supporting 
arguments stems from the fact that Article 9, Section 2 of the Administrative 
Case Litigation Act was newly enacted through the Amendment to the 
Administrative Case Litigation Act in 2004.89  These scholars believe that 
the 2004 Amendment fundamentally changed the third party’s rights of 
standing to sue.90   The claim that many of the lawsuits referred by the 
oppositions, including Shufuren Juice Lawsuit, Ebisu Shokuhin Lawsuit, 
Nobo Amano Lawsuit, and Mitsubishi Bank Lawsuit, are found under the 
pre-2004 Administrative Case Litigation Act, and thus, lack a precedential 
value.91  After 2005, the issue of the administrative case has become who 
has a “legal interest” to sue.  
1. Statutory Interpretation  
There are numerous provisions under the Antimonopoly Act that offer 
a variety of rights to third parties who are damaged by exclusionary 
activities.  For example, Article 25 of the Antimonopoly Act states that an 
enterprise in violation of the Antimonopoly Act is liable for “damages 
suffered by another party.”92  It is important to note that the Act does not 
																																								 																				
89  Gyōsei jiken soshou hō [Administrative Case Litigation Act], Law No. 139 of 1962, art.1 (Japan). 
90  See Kazuhiro Tsuchida, supra note 70. 
91  See Kazuhiro Tsuchida, supra note 70 at 80; See Minoru Fujita, supra note 10, at 135.; See Annen, 
supra note 51 at 49; Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (Shufuren Juice Lawsuit) Mar. 14, 1974, Shō 49 (tsu) no. 
99, 32 Saikō Saibansho minji hanreishū [Minshū] 2, 211 (Japan); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (Ebisu 
Lawsuit) Nov. 16, 1972, Shō 45 (wo) no. 1055, 16 Saikō Saibansho minji hanreishū [Minshū] 9, 1573 
(Japan); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (Nobo Amano Lawsuit) Nov. 28, 1975, Shō 48 (wo) no. 499, 29 Saikō 
Saibansho minji hanreishū [Minshū] 10, 1592 (Japan); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (Mitsubishi Bank 
Lawsuit) Jun. 08, 1960, Shō 35, 10 Saiketsu jireishū[Saiketsu jirei] 91 (Japan) 
92 Daitaro Kishii, JASRAC Shiteki Dokusen Jiken Toukyou Kousai Hanketsu [JASRAC Private 
Monopolization Case at Tokyo High Court], 1031 NBL 71, 73 (2014). 
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explicitly provide a third party legal right of standing to sue, but also does 
not deny it.  While the JFTC is predetermined to be the defendant for 
revocation of the judgment by lawsuit under Article 78, the Antimonopoly 
Act does not explicitly identify who the plaintiff must be.  Instead, Article 
77 merely states that the party may submit an objection to the JFTC 
committee’s judgment to the Tokyo High Court within 30 days from the date 
that the judgment is made.93   
In an instance where the AMA does not provide a specific legal 
procedure, the Administrative Case Litigation Act comes into play.94  Under 
Article 9, Section 1 of the Act, the standing is provided for “a person who 
has legal interest to seek the revocation of the original administration 
disposition or of the administration disposition on appeal.”95  These scholars 
believe that recent cases illustrate the definition of “a person with legal 
interest.”  
2. Comparison with Precedent  
In Odakyu Tetsudou Lawsuit, decided in 2005, the Supreme Court of 
Japan granted third party residents who were affected by “health and living 
environment with substantial damage directly” the standing to sue under 
Article 9, Section 2 of the 2004 Administrative Case Litigation Act. 96  
Indeed, phrases such as “substantial damage” and “directly,” used in the 
JASRAC case, are referenced from this case.  Furthermore, scholars think 
that the word “directly” is not limited in the sense of “physically direct,” 
such as rocks falling, but rather implies a logical chain of events, including a 
neighboring resident suffering from noise and vibration of construction 
work.97  In the more recent Satellite Osaka Lawsuit, the Supreme Court 
decision also contained a similar phrasing about a “substantial” factor of 
suffering: “the person opens medical institution in the area that could 
potentially and substantially interrupt the operation of other entities.”98  By 
comparing with these recent cases, it is reasonable to interpret that the 
JASRAC case expanded third party’s standing to sue with the “legal right” 
under the amended Administrative Case Litigation Act while it still limited 
																																								 																				
93  See Annen, supra note 51. 
94  Gyōsei jiken soshou hō [Administrative Case Litigation Act], Law No. 139 of 1962, art.1 (Japan). 
95  Id. at art. 9 (emphasis added). 
96  See Chūkai Gyōmuhō [Act of Brokerage Services for Copyright], Law No. 67 of 1939, 138 
(Japan); see Kazuhiro Tsuchida, supra note 70 at 80.  
97  Id. at 81.  
98  See Minoru Fujita, supra note 10 at 138; Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (Osaka Satellite Lawsuit) 
Oct. 15, 2009, Hei 20 (hi) no. 247, 63 Saikō Saibansho minji hanreishū [Minshū] 8, 1711 (Japan). 
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the scope to certain class of party with a person who received “substantial” 
and “direct” damages.99   
C. Third Party’s Standing to Sue Under the Current Direct Appeal 
to District Court Procedure 
The JASRAC case attracted the attention of various scholars.  As 
repeatedly mentioned, this is the first case in which the JFTC withdrew its 
cease and desist order, as well as the first instance when the judiciary 
conferred a third party with standing to sue in an Antimonopoly Proceeding 
in pursuit of a judgment against the addressee.  Incidentally, before the 
conclusion of the JASRAC case on April 28th, 2015, the Legislature 
amended the AMA in 2013 and introduced a new Antimonopoly Proceeding: 
the Direct Appeal to the District Court Procedure.  
Under the new procedure, instead of the JFTC conducting an 
administrative hearing, the appeals from the JFTC are directly transferred to 
the Tokyo District Court.100  This change implicitly eliminates the possibility 
for a third party to continue an existing legal dispute from the appellate court 
level.  However, a third party may still be involved in the Antimonopoly 
Proceeding as an intervener of the case on behalf of the defendant, the 
JFTC.101  If a third party proactively demands this action, the court may 
analyze whether the potential intervenor constitutes a “person with legal 
interest,” similar to the analysis completed in the JASRAC case.  
Furthermore, whether such an intervener has standing to sue when it hopes 
to appeal a lower court’s judgment without the consent of the JFTC will 
continue to be a question.102  In this regard, a third party’s standing to sue 
will remain an important question under the Antimonopoly Proceeding in 
Japan. 
V. CONCLUSION 	
After the Supreme Court remanded the JASRAC case to the JFTC 
with directions to withdraw the cease and desist order, the JFTC sent a 
notice to JASRAC and resumed the hearing process.103  However, JASRAC 
																																								 																				
99  See Kazuhiro Tsuchida, supra note 70. 
100 Enactment of the Bill to Amend the Antimonopoly Act, JFTC, (Dec. 9. 2013), 
http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2013/Dec/individual131209.html. 
101  See Nobuo Shimazaki, supra note 6, at 35. 
102  Id. 
103  JAPANESE SOCIETY FOR RIGHTS OF AUTHORS, COMPOSERS, AND PUBLISHERS, DECISION ON 
RESUMPTION OF HEARING PROCEDURES (2015), http://www.jasrac.or.jp/ejhp/release/2015/0626.html. 
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later withdrew from the proceedings. 104   In its press release, JASRAC 
offered several reasons for its decision, including a change in circumstances 
and a desire to focus on its business operations. 105   JASRAC also 
restructured its management and introduced a new president, which may 
have contributed to this decision.106 
On the other hand, Avex Music Publishing (“AMP”) acquired 
significant shares of Japan Rights Clearance.107   Japan Rights Clearance 
subsequently merged with e-License to establish NexTone on February 1, 
2016.108  At that time, these two organizations were the second and third-
largest music copyright management service companies in Japan.109  The 
two companies fully merged on April 3, 2017.110  NexTone plans to provide 
services that focus on new digital platforms and promises that the new 
company will provide healthy competition to JASRAC.111   
The JASRAC case shed light on unique questions when engaging the 
Antimonopoly Proceeding in Japan.  It pointed out a rare issue under the 
JFTC’s hearing system and the Complaint Review Procedure, especially 
since the JFTC’s special committee had never withdrawn a cease and desist 
order except in this JASRAC case.  It further touched on a third party’s 
standing to sue another party—specifically, a sole competitor—under the 
AMA and in relation to the Administrative Case Litigation Act.   
The Antimonopoly Act protects the public interest by promoting a fair 
market, while not unduly interfering with the activities of private parties.  
Furthermore, the interaction between a potential monopoly and the JFTC 
could impact the operation of competitors and other third parties in 
significant ways.  Within this complex area of law, if the third party standing 
																																								 																				
104 JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, WITHDRAWAL OF JFTC HEARING REQUEST (2016), 
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Shingaisha “NexTone” Shidouhe, [“Expansion of music copyrights,” e-License and JRC merged. New 
Company “NexTone” emerged], ITMEDIA NEWS (Dec. 17, 2015), 
http://www.itmedia.co.jp/news/articles/1512/17/news144.html.  
110  Chosakuken Kanrijigyou Kanzentougou No Oshirase [Announcement on the Full Merger of 
Copyright Management Operations], NEXTONE (Apr. 3, 2017), http://www.nex-
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111  Daisuke Kikuchi, Stranglehold on music copyrights is loosening in Japan, JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 27, 
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to sue issue arises again under the current Direct Appeal to the District Court 
Procedure or another form of Antimonopoly Proceeding in the future, the 
analysis conducted by the court—as well as other articles published by 
various scholars for this JASRAC case—will be very insightful in deciding 
whether to permit a third party to intervene in an Antimonopoly Proceeding, 
and if so, what consideration the court should give to effectively limit the 
class of third parties with such a right to intervene. 
